THE "LONG MOVEMENT" AS VAMPIRE:
TEMPORAL AND SPATIAL FALLACIES
IN RECENT BLACK FREEDOM STUDIES

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Over the past three decades, scholarship on postwar African American social movements became a mature, well-rounded area of study with different interpretative schools and conflicting theoretical frameworks. However, recently, the complexity generated by clashing interpretations has eroded as a new paradigm has become hegemonic. Since the publication of Freedom North by Jeanne F. Theoharis and Komozi Woodard, the "Long Movement" has emerged as the dominant theoretical interpretation of the modern "Civil Rights" and "Black Power" movements. The Long Movement interpretative framework consists of four interrelated conceptualizations that challenge the previous interpretations of black freedom movements. The four propositions are: (1) Locality, the modern Civil Rights (and Black Power) movement(s) was a series of local struggles rather than a national social movement; (2) Reperiodization, the modern Civil Rights (and Black Power) movement(s) transcends the historical period 1955–1975; (3) Continuity, the Civil Rights and Black Power movements are not distinct social movements, but rather a single continuous struggle for black freedom; and (4) The South was not distinct, the differences between southern de jure and northern de facto racial oppression were exaggerated, and racism is nationwide. While a few of the individual propositions may be accurate, collectively, we believe, they misinterpret the modern Black Liberation Movement (BLM). Thus, this essay challenges the theoretical propositions and historical interpretations of the Long Movement thesis.

We question the adequacy of the Long Movement thesis because it collapses periodization schemas, erases conceptual differences between waves of the BLM, and blurs regional distinctions in the African American experience. Indeed, we view the characteristics of the Long Movement thesis as analogous to those of the mythical vampire. This metaphor is apt because the vampire's distinguishing feature is not its predatory blood drinking. Rather, its distinctive trait is its undead status; that is, it exists outside of time and history, beyond the processes of life and death, and change and development. The vampire is thoroughly rootless and without place—it makes its home everywhere and nowhere. Recent

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examples of the Long Movement scholarship mirror these particular vampiric traits. First, much of the new scholarship stretches the chronologies of the Civil Rights and Black Power movements past the point of their explanatory power. By constantly relocating the BLM’s origins and endpoints forward and backward, Long Movement scholars treat Civil Rights and/or Black Power as virtually eternal, like a vampire. Second, few scholars clearly define what they mean by “Civil Rights” or “Black Power,” a move which facilitates erasing the differences between campaigns for black civil rights and struggles for Black Power. Third, by treating considerations of place as theoretically ephemeral, the Long Movement scholarship dispenses with the role of space and political economy in shaping specific, historically bound modes of social interaction. The cumulative result is a largely ahistorical and placeless chronicle with questionable interpretive insight.

Motivated by a desire to use historical methodologies to aid in revitalizing the BLM and renewing the struggle for social transformation, we present a four-part explication and critique of the Long Movement’s conceptual framework. The first section explores the development of scholarly studies of the Civil Rights and Black Power movements. The second interrogates the excessive elasticity of periodization schemas, which we maintain exaggerate continuity in African American social movement history. Part three discusses Long Movement proponents’ collapsing of the concepts “Civil Rights” and “Black Power.” The fourth examines Long Movement scholars’ arguments for erasing the Mason-Dixon Line in BLM histories.

TOWARD HEGEMONY: SCHOLARSHIP ON THE BLACK FREEDOM MOVEMENT, 1975 TO THE PRESENT

Serious scholarship on the modern Civil Rights Movement (CRM) emerged in the late 1970s in the wake of the major campaigns. Historian Steven F. Lawson has divided the scholarship into three waves or “generations”; we posit a fourth wave, scholars engaged in what historian Peniel Joseph calls the “New Black Power Studies.” The earliest wave of scholars painted the modern CRM as spontaneous and discontinuous with previous struggles. From this perspective the movement began either with the 1954 U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka or in 1955 with the individual heroism of seamstress Rosa Parks in Montgomery, Alabama. Works written in this vein tended to be “top-down” accounts that emphasized national issues. Often implicitly following a resource mobilization framework, they credited the movement’s success to Dr. Martin Luther King’s charisma, white liberal politicians, northern white patronage, the labor-liberal alliance, and/or the media’s televised exposure of southern racial violence.
Beginning in the 1980s, however, a second wave of historians and social scientists began to challenge previous depictions. In *The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement*, sociologist Aldon D. Morris argued that the movement was the result of coherent planning by what political scientist Michael C. Dawson has called the "black counterpublic" located in preexisting indigenous African American social networks and organizations. Historians such as Clayborne Carson also called attention to the internal life of African American social movements, stressing the ways preexisting social networks and institutions helped generate varied strategies and tactics, leadership, and identities. More importantly, revisionists such as Carson, Morris, William H. Chafe, Robert J. Norrell, John Dittmer and Charles Payne championed an *indigenous* perspective which was attentive to local people, lesser-known leaders, and working-class activists, who formed the movement’s base. Lawson’s “interactive” model, on the other hand, considered the exchanges between local insurgency and national institutional efforts.

Sociologist Doug McAdam, and historians Manning Marable, Jack M. Bloom, and others, representing the third wave, struggled to identify and explain the long-term structural factors underlying the movement’s origins, development, and outcomes. They alternately assigned primacy to African American agency, evolving local and national economies, the Cold War, and the changing structures of opportunity and constraint in a historically racist society. Despite serious differences regarding approaches—top-down versus bottom-up—and the role of African American agency, scholars in the first three waves shared an understanding of the movement’s chronology. In the main, they saw the period 1954/55–1965 as the modern “Civil Rights Era.”

Attuned to historian Peter B. Levy’s observation that black freedom struggles were “not neat geographically, chronologically or ideologically,” a fourth wave not only disputed the standard narratives, but advocated a re-imagining of the BLM. Jettisoning the conventional 1954/55–65 timeframe, scholars such as Theoharis, Woodard, Matthew Countryman, Robert O. Self, Nikhil Pal Singh, and Jacquelyn Dowd Hall reconceptualized the movement’s timeframe, arguing that its origins, *not its antecedents*, were in the 1930s and 1940s, and that it extended to the 1980s. According to Hall, the “civil rights unionism” of the 1930s and 1940s “was not just a precursor of the modern CRM. It was its first phase.” Additionally, Robert O. Self contended the 1954/55–65 framework marginalized the “black radical tradition” by privileging liberal black politics. Moreover, Self argued, the Long Movement thesis reveals black activists’ “complex, long-term, militant engagement” with the U.S. “welfare-warfare state,” both in terms of domestic policy and international politics. Thus, the Long Movement paradigm, according to Self, encompasses a national and international terrain, rather than merely confronting a recalcitrant regional racial regime. In this new narrative, the CRM’s goals were more complex and far-reaching than
the destruction of petty apartheid, and possessed an ideological and political diversity that transcended liberal thought and nonviolence.8

The chronological, conceptual, and geographic reframing embodied in the Long Movement thesis has also challenged the dichotomy which earlier scholarship drew between the CRM and the Black Power Movement (BPM). Both liberal and conservative scholars contrasted normatively “good” southern civil rights struggles of the early 1960s with “nihilistic” northern Black Power militancy during the “bad” late 1960s. Thus, many historians in the fourth wave have adopted the terms “Black Freedom Movement” or the “black freedom struggle,” a concept popularized by Carson in the 1980s, to encompass the early and late 1960s. Carson challenged the term “civil rights” on two grounds. First, he argued, it presumed “the southern black movements of the 1960s remained within the ideological boundaries of previous civil rights activism.” Second, he claimed the concept led scholars to misperceive the movement “as part of a coordinated national campaign” rather than “a locally-based social movement.” Theoharis, Woodard, Charles Payne, and Timothy Tyson also find “civil rights” too limiting to capture the range and continuity of African American political projects before and after the Brown decision and the Montgomery Bus Boycott. Whereas Carson was drawing a distinction between litigation and mass direct action and civil disobedience, Theoharis and others are focused on eliminating distinctions between the Civil Rights and Black Power movements. Theoharis put it thus, “framing it as the black freedom movement...has moved our understandings of the movement beyond a dichotomy between civil rights and Black Power both ideologically and chronologically.”9

Theoharis, Woodard, Self, and Payne are particularly attracted to the Long Movement’s focus on local movements, especially in the urban North. They question the distinctions earlier scholars made between southern de jure and northern de facto segregation. This perspective views white supremacy below the Mason-Dixon Line as not appreciably different from that above, and sees the modern BLM as much a product of black activists’ engagement with racist New Deal liberalism in the North as with southern Jim Crow. In de-centering the southern-focused narrative, Countryman, Self, Levy, Martha Biondi, and others have sought to place black freedom struggles for fair employment, open housing, quality education, and equitable criminal justice outside the South at the forefront of the BLM.10

Many of the historiographical developments associated with the turn toward the Long Movement are corrective and spotlight the ideological and tactical heterogeneity of the CRM. Perhaps the most important contribution of fourth-wave scholarship has been its re-centering of African American women and gender into Civil Rights and Black Power narratives. In contrast to older male-focused histories, scholars such as Bettye Collier-Thomas, V. P. Franklin, Belinda Robnett, Barbara Ransby, and Kimberly Springer have documented the
multiple roles of African American women activists, and the centrality of gender to the movement more broadly. Additionally, this fourth wave has highlighted the coexistence of liberal, black nationalist, and radical ideologies and practices; as well as nonviolence and armed self-defense, during the movement’s “heroic” civil rights period. Among the fourth wave’s other important innovations has been recovering the direct political and ideological links between African Americans and Pan-African and/or revolutionary movements abroad. Most significantly, the fourth wave is the first to seriously study and research Black Power. In contrast to scholars such as Payne, who characterized the shift to Black Power as a retreat from grassroots organizing, Peniel Joseph, Yohuru Williams, and others have documented black nationalists’ and black radicals’ engagement in local community organizing, and their work to further democratize movement leadership in the North. By the same token, Countryman, Rhonda Y. Williams, Christina Greene, and others have challenged accounts emphasizing Black Power’s masculinist ethos by illustrating how women were among those activated by Black Power politics. Overall, the thrust of the new “Black Freedom Studies” has raised new areas of inquiry, challenged Manichean divisions that have undermined a deeper understanding of the movement’s internal life, and expanded scholars’ knowledge of the breadth and diversity of local struggles.

Nevertheless, the Long Movement’s major flaw is its ahistorical totalizing perspective. By this we mean the tendency to flatten chronological, conceptual, and geographic differences. We contend that though scholars are adopting this temporal-theoretical-spatial framework, it remains a scaffold that contradicts much of the empirical evidence presented in the studies themselves. In other words, it contains a bundle of assumptions more evoked than demonstrated in the research. Thus, while a new paradigm has indeed taken shape, its contours are still pliable. Moreover, scholars attracted to the Long Movement thesis have applied it differently and unevenly. Insofar as a totalizing perspective influences the thrust of recent scholarship, like the vampire, it effectively removes the BLM from the historical processes of change, development, demise, and regeneration. The Long Movement thesis not only distorts the history of the BLM, it also undermines the utility of these historical studies to inform future struggles for social change.

THE UNDYING CHARACTER OF THE LONG MOVEMENT

The Long Movement perspective views the Civil Rights Movement, and to a lesser degree the Black Power Movement, as undying. It is this ahistorical quality that gives the Long Movement thesis its vampire-like characteristics. Historian Charles Eagles addressed this quality in a provocative essay that appeared in the Journal of Southern History in 2000. He contended that “until scholars acknowledge the end of the movement... historians will need to muster even
greater historical imagination to write new histories of the 20th century
movement and its era in a more detached, well-rounded, balanced manner.”
Quoting Cold War historian John Gaddis, Eagles contended that contemporary
civil rights narratives constitute “abnormal history,” anomalous in large part
because scholars refuse to see the CRM as “a discrete episode . . . within the
stream of time.” We concur with the first part of Eagles’s analysis; scholars must
acknowledge the end of the Civil Rights and Black Power waves of the BLM.
Recognizing the Civil Rights and Black Power movements as waves in a broader
more complex river of resistance and affirmation, the Black Liberation
Movement, is not tantamount to acceptance of a declension narrative,
emphasizing a “golden age” of nonviolent protest followed by a period of black
militancy and racial chauvinism.13

Driven to contest the limitations and misinterpretations inherent in the
popular narratives of the movement, fourth-wave scholars have largely
challenged declension narratives. Responding to this popular narrative creates
multiple problems. For example, there are many, not one, declension narratives.
Liberal and progressive versions condemn Black Power arguing, or more often
implying, that it precipitated the demise of the CRM. For instance, Allen
Matusow claimed Black Power was the product of “radical disillusionment” and
the harbinger of “white backlash” because “whites sensed the racial animosity it
implied.” In his book In Struggle, Carson suggested that Black Power hastened
the end of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). Doug
McAdam goes further and specifies two consequences of the shift to Black
Power: it fractured the CRM and paved the way for the demise of the national
movement, reducing it to a series of disconnected local struggles. Even Payne
articulated a kind of declension narrative, arguing that Black Power facilitated a
tactical shift from a grassroots organizing tradition toward a top-down mobilizing
strategy, which in turn created a lull or downturn in the movement. Proponents of
the Long Movement, however, do not engage these liberal and progressive
scholars, except Matusow; instead, they focus on the less challenging,
conservative versions of the declension narrative.14

We find somewhat compelling the Long Movement scholars’ critique of the
conservatives’ more recent effort to rewrite history, reposition themselves as
supporters of the CRM, and reduce the CRM to a struggle against prejudice and
for the creation of a “colorblind society.” Such a critique, however, is not very
difficult, given the abundance of evidence of the liberal and progressive nature of
the movement. What is difficult is to turn the lens inward, to interrogate the
limitations inherent in the perspectives put forward by progressive scholars such
as Carson, McAdam, and Payne.

To refute the conservative version of the declension narrative, Long
Movement scholars have sought to extend the timeframe of what Theoharis and
Woodard refer to as the “black freedom struggle,” or what Hall calls “the Long
Civil Rights Movement.” As the difference in nomenclature implies, scholars have different conceptions of “the movement,” thus they re-imagine the chronology quite differently. Hall’s terminology is notable because the decision to use “Civil Rights” as the catch-all phrase minimizes “Black Power” to simply a militant moment in the history of the CRM. In this way, Black Power is reduced to a particular set of tactics; or worse, it is altogether suppressed as a specific movement with its own strategic vision, goals and objectives, leaders and followers, practices, symbols and discourses. Others treat the chronology differently. For instance, in Eagles’s equally insightful and problematic article, he champions pushing the timeframe backward, but seems ambivalent about extending it beyond 1968. For the post-1968 era, he is interested primarily in the CRM’s “legacies or ramifications.”

More importantly, the continuous 1930s–1970s timeline theorized by Long Movement scholars ignores or minimizes the ruptures and fractures that the early Cold War and the FBI-coordinated counterintelligence campaigns of the late 1960s and early 1970s had on postwar black freedom struggles. Historians Gerald Horne, Mary Dudziak, James Hunter Meriwether, and others working on the period from the 1930s to the 1950s, especially those scholars examining black internationalism and Pan-Africanism, agree that the Cold War crippled and disrupted what Horne described as a “militant anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist community.” President Harry S. Truman’s 1947 Executive Order 9806, aimed at identifying “subversives” in the federal government, forced progressives to retreat from positions they had advocated from the 1930s. By 1948 W. E. B. Du Bois, Paul Robeson, Claudia Jones, and other black radicals had come under attack. Scholars of foreign policy and black internationalism demonstrate that the early Cold War sidelined radicals, and stalled and deformed the BLM as liberals shrank from being labeled “communists.” The repressive environment very likely delayed the emergence of a mass-based CRM for at least a decade. As these scholars indicate, when African American ferment surged again, it was stripped of the radical, social democratic, and anti-imperialist dimensions that had defined it in the preceding period. According to Mary Dudziak,

By silencing certain voices and by promoting a particular vision of racial justice, the Cold War led to a narrowing of acceptable civil rights discourse. The narrowed boundaries of Cold War-era civil rights politics kept discussions of broad-based social change, or a linking of race and class, off the agenda. The narrow terms of Cold War civil rights discourse and the nature of the federal government’s commitment help explain the limits of social change during this period.

Early postwar anticommunism eliminated some organizations such as the radical “National Negro Labor Council,” and assured the ascendance of moderate replacements like the virulently anticommunist “Negro American Labor Council.” In the South particularly, the Cold War gave segregationists additional
ammunition for attacking demands for civil rights—"communist subversion." This is not to say that African American activism ceased, or that all militant and radical individuals and organizers suffered the same fate. Some, like Robeson, were thoroughly isolated; others, like Detroit labor leader Coleman Young, economist Abram Harris, Jr., and political scientist Ralph Bunche reinvented themselves as mainstream black liberals. Very few, however, continued as they had during the 1930s, or the World War II era.  

Long Movement scholars generally fail to engage these issues of postwar anticommunist repression. For example, of the twenty-four articles in Theoharis and Woodard's two anthologies, only three (the ones by Beth Bates, Robert Self, and Michael Washington) even cover the period between 1947 and the 1955 Montgomery Bus Boycott. We argue that the early Cold War era represented a critical moment of rupture, which despite the continued activism of some individuals, undermined earlier efforts at organized and militant anticolonialist and anti-imperialist activism by progressive African Americans. Thus, the CRM which emerged in the mid-1950s differed qualitatively in terms of goals, ideology, discourse, and symbols from those associated with the National Negro Congress, the Council on African Affairs, and other African American initiatives which sought to link race, class, anticolonialism, and in the case of the "Sojourners for Truth," gender during the 1930s and 1940s.  

The same holds true for assessing the state-sponsored terrorism leveled against the 1960s BLM. In their zeal to offset popular narratives of declension, Long Movement advocates tend also to ignore or minimize the cumulative effects of the FBI's Counterintelligence Program ("COINTELPRO"). In his classic work *Black Awakening in Capitalist America*, Robert L. Allen described a scenario that was similar to the McCarthy period in suppressing and warping the movement's radical and militant nationalist tendencies, though it was far more violent. According to Allen, black radicals were actively discredited, marginalized, or crushed, while more moderate movement tendencies were promoted by the Ford Foundation and incorporated into the Nixon Administration. Again, we do not mean to suggest that the years after the mid-1970s were bereft of activism, but certainly, these years witnessed the demise or crippling of most radical and militant black nationalist formations, including the Black Panther Party (effectively by 1977), the Congress of African Peoples (1975), the African Liberation Support Committee (1977), the National Welfare Rights Organization (1975), National Black Feminist Organization (1975), the National Black Political Assembly (1978), the League of Revolutionary Black Workers (1975), and the Third World Women's Alliance (1977). Chapters of many of these groups continued to function in some cities, and some factions within these organizations merged with the budding "New Communist Movement," but the reality was that many were effectively smashed, while others became shadows of their former selves. By the activists' own accounts, the mid-
to-late 1970s constituted a "lull" in the movement, a moment of retreat, reconceptualization, and regrouping. As Woodard, a former activist, noted, "In some ways, 1974 marked the beginning of the end of Black Power as a national movement."

Underscoring the difference between the 1940s and the late 1960s, Rhonda Williams details how in Baltimore, the strategy and discourse of black female public housing tenants changed between these two moments. According to Williams, in the 1940s these women struggled for "respectability," but in the late 1960s they shifted direction and fought for "respect," specifically tenants' rights. During and after the era of the "Great Society," tenants' rights battles occurred within a larger historical context characterized by the declining urban economies where public housing units were located; increasing poverty, a rising percentage of single-parent families; the codification of theories of black "matriarchy" and cultural "pathology"; the increasing stigmatization of public housing tenants; and the escalating conservative assault on liberal social welfare programs. In other words, a contextual approach to the study of African American urban communities—one grounded in changing patterns of regional political economies, municipal governance, metropolitan development, civic culture, and federal policy—undermines conceptually limited accounts that tend to treat the 1930s and 1940s the same as the late 1960s and 1970s. The Great Society was raced and gendered differently from the New Deal, thus the resistance that emanated from African American communities was different during those periods as well.

Whereas the first wave of civil rights historians made a fetish of movement discontinuity, fourth-wave scholars bend the stick too far in the opposite direction. The Long Movement framework, positing an unbroken chain of insurgency from the 1930s-1940s to the 1970s-1980s, falters when one considers the ruptures created by domestic anticommunist campaigns in the late 1940s and early 1950s, and the wide-ranging federal counterintelligence operations directed against militant black activists in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The problem with perspectives of unbroken historical continuity, to quote historian Adam Fairclough, is that "in stressing history's 'seamless web,' they turn history into a homogenized mush, without sharp breaks, and clear transitions and transformations." This is an appropriate description of one major, but surely not the only, problem with the Long Movement thesis.

BLEEDING THE MEANING(S) OUT OF CIVIL RIGHTS AND BLACK POWER

Not only has the new scholarship failed to define "Civil Rights" and "Black Power," but it provided no clear meanings for the concept of a "social movement." This lack of clear working definitions amounts to what historian
David Hackett Fischer terms “fallacies of semantical distortion,” muddying the meanings of ideas and concepts. In political discourse, “civil rights” refer to privileges the state grants its citizens, and protections against unjustifiable infringement by either the state or private citizens. In the black experience in the United States, civil and political rights historically have been interwoven; for African Americans, civil rights have connoted incorporation into the U.S. polity, as well as American civil society. This is most compatible with variants of mainstream liberal ideology. Black Power, on the other hand, derived its central meanings from a diverse tradition of black nationalist thought and practice. Programmatically, Black Power was heterogeneous, reflecting a range of activities centering on autonomic empowerment efforts—Black Studies curricula, feminist consciousness-raising, community control of schools and police, private capitalist enterprise, alternative religious iconographies and artistic expression, land-based reparations campaigns, electoral politics, prison reform, self-determination and dignity for welfare recipients, radical union caucus campaigns at the point of production, and so forth. These initiatives typically involved the creation of independent institutions, and a conscious emphasis on African Americans’ distinct cultural ethos. As it stands, the absence of clear criteria for defining the terms has enabled scholars to commit an “either/or” fallacy and to argue that since the differences between Civil Rights and Black Power were merely a matter of degree, then no real differences existed.

The lack of discernment in conceptualization, an overly elastic chronology, and inattention to the significance of historical ruptures enable Long Movement theorists to collapse the boundaries between the Civil Rights and Black Power waves of the larger Black Liberation Movement. In her essay “Black Freedom Struggles,” Theoharis unpacks the meaning of this phrase and argues that the notion of “the black freedom movement” allows scholars to get “beyond a dichotomy between civil rights and Black Power both ideologically and chronologically.” What she considers a false dichotomy has erroneously led some scholars to view certain tactics and themes such as self-defense, internationalism, teaching Black History, and combating police brutality as only Black Power concerns, and to treat desegregation, civil disobedience, and electoral politics as civil rights issues. As many African American historians have demonstrated, these issues have persisted across time. However, their existence during the 1930s, 1960s, or 1980s, or that both Civil Rights and Black Power activists challenged these forms of racial oppression, or utilized similar tactics in doing so, does not demonstrate that “Civil Rights” and “Black Power” were the same. Black liberals, nationalists, and radicals have organized against the multiple forms of racial oppression and utilized similar tactics, but that does not mean that their conceptions of “black freedom” were identical. What Theoharis and Woodard and other Long Movement advocates miss is that ideology, discourse, and long range objectives matter as much, if not more, than
the specific inequities challenged, or the particular means employed toward those ends. Rather than view Civil Rights and Black Power as successive waves of a broader BLM, differentiated by strategy and tactics, organizations, leadership, membership, ideology, discourses, symbols and practices, Long Movement advocates aggregate them into one undifferentiated mass of characteristics. Such formulations distort the historical process. Timothy Tyson's *Radio Free Dixie: Robert F. Williams and the Roots of Black Power* is an appropriate example. "The life of Robert F. Williams," Tyson averred, "illustrates that 'the civil rights movement' and 'the Black Power movement' emerged from the same soil, confronted the same predicaments, and reflected the same quest for African American freedom." This quote more than any other justifies our deployment of the vampire analogy. As historian Simon Wendt argued, Tyson rendered Williams's thought static, and obscured his ideological transformation from liberal to black nationalist and ultimately to revolutionary internationalist. In arguing that Civil Rights and Black Power grew out of the same situation, encountered the same conditions and problematics, and embodied the same search for freedom, Tyson freezes history and blurs different conceptualizations of black freedom. The CRM was an earthquake, an eruption whose seismic eruptions shattered the legal foundation of American apartheid. It shifted the social relations between African Americans and whites, transformed the black political terrain, and created new possibilities that were seized by the advocates of Black Power. Tyson's analysis sucked the life out of Williams's unprecedented odyssey and bled dry the differences among the various sociohistorical contexts Williams confronted.

Gloria Richardson, a militant black freedom activist in Cambridge, Maryland, during the early 1960s, is another example often cited by Long Movement scholars to highlight the similarities in the strategies of Civil Rights and Black Power campaigns. Historians Sharon Harley and Peter Levy are among several scholars who contend that Richardson and the Cambridge Movement occupies a liminal space between Civil Rights and Black Power. Cambridge activists were embroiled in armed confrontations with white civilians, police, and National Guardsmen in 1962 and 1963. Moreover, Richardson's Cambridge Nonviolent Action Committee (CNAC), a heavily working-class organization, refused to endorse a referendum on the desegregation of local public accommodations. Arguing that African American citizenship was not subject to a vote, Richardson and other leaders rejected the goals of integration in favor of an emphasis on remediying economic inequality. According to Levy, activists in Cambridge "sour[ed] on nonviolence and adopt[ed] a more radical posture than the mainstream movement before black power became a national cause."
However, depictions of Richardson as the "Godmother of Black Power" are tenable only if one assumes that civil rights campaigns in other locations were generally unconcerned with economic justice, and commanded few working-class constituents; or that Black Power was primarily a rejection of nonviolence. However, none of this was the case. In contrast to descriptions of Richardson as a "gun-toting" heroine, historian Jenny Walker maintained that there is no evidence that Richardson or any CNAC members participated in armed action, or even carried weapons. Yet Walker overstated her case in suggesting that Richardson did not diverge dramatically from the civil rights mainstream; this overlooks her collaboration with black nationalists such as Malcolm X. Peter Levy ultimately concluded that if Richardson appears to be an outlier in the standard civil rights narrative, it is in large part due to the political and social particularity of Cambridge, Maryland, a border-state location where African Americans had voted for generations. There are always antecedents, precursors, and transitional individuals and organizations in social movements, so like Robert F. Williams, the activism of Gloria Richardson does not undermine larger categories of "Civil Rights" and "Black Power." Rather, the Cambridge Movement was what civil rights campaigns looked like in a border state.25

As in the case of Richardson, blurring the distinctions between Civil Rights and Black Power is often the result of a superficial reading of movement tactics, which are presumed to be definitive. Form is mistaken for essence. For example, historians Timothy Tyson, Lance Hill, and others have curiously accepted master narrative renderings of the Black Power Movement that tend to reduce it to wild and dangerous "Negroes with guns." This is somewhat strange since this view implicitly reinforces the conservatives' declension narrative of Black Power as preoccupied with "violence." As Wendt, Hill, Sundiata Keita Cha-Jua, Akinyele Umoja, and Christopher Strain have argued, armed self-defense has been a common tactic throughout African American history. "We now know," Wendt stated in his work on clandestine African American defense units in the South during the early 1960s, "that armed resistance . . . played a far more significant role in the southern civil rights struggle than previously thought." However, some such as Strain have tended to overemphasize its centrality to civil rights campaigns, and use its presence throughout to challenge dichotomies between pre- and post-1965 movements. For Tyson and others, knowledge of southern armed struggle has precipitated a reductionist logic: If the distinguishing feature of Black Power was armed self-defense, and if African Americans practiced this before and during the CRM, then "Black Power" was not a decisive break from "Civil Rights."26

Reductionist definitions of Black Power suggest the need for greater attention to the intellectual and cultural dimensions of the BLM. That is, civil rights activists could advocate armed militancy, just as Black Power activists could participate in institutional politics. Nevertheless, even when their political
practices were similar, they served divergent goals and objectives, and were framed differently by the activists involved. This point was potently made by social theorist Harold Cruse in his assessment of Robert Williams’s espousal of armed self-defense during his tenure as head of the Monroe, North Carolina, NAACP. Cruse admonished:

[T]he adoption of armed self-defense does not, in itself, transform what was a protest movement into a revolutionary movement.... If Williams had, at the same time, changed his social objective, he might have fulfilled this definition [as a revolutionary]. His objective remained exactly what it was before—desegregation. And desegregation of public facilities was also the aim of the official NAACP leadership. Thus Williams differed not in aims, but in tactics when he opted for armed self-defense.  

Wendt also made this argument, when he rhetorically asked, “Were the Deacons for Defense and Justice, or similar defense units which emerged in Dixie in the first half of the 1960s, actually the precursors, or even the natural allies, of Black Power groups such as the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense?” Wendt pointed out there were “conspicuous differences” between the two groups’ use of armed self-defense. Whereas the Panthers viewed the African American situation as domestic or “internal colonialism,” which necessitated an armed revolutionary struggle for liberation, the Deacons interpreted the African American condition as one of “second class citizenship” and used armed resistance to complement the liberal integrationist goals and the dominant nonviolent stratagem of the civil rights struggle. In his book on the Deacons, Lance Hill reached a similar judgment, arguing that the Deacons did not differ ideologically in any fundamental way from the prevailing civil rights liberal orthodoxy. Although at times Hill implicitly identifies Black Power in terms of armed self-defense, ultimately he concluded that the Deacons were at best a “bridge” between Civil Rights and an emerging Black Power Movement.  

Likewise, both the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP) and the Congress of African Peoples (CAP) engaged in electoral politics; yet, the MFDP’s goals and objectives were framed in terms of liberal integrationism, while CAP reflected the resurgent aims, objectives, and discourses of Pan-African nationalism. For civil rights activists, participating in mainstream electoral politics would have meant incorporating African Americans into the existing polity as equals; for Black Power theorists, it often meant transforming majority-African American cities and counties into “liberated zones” as a prelude to some form of territorial or sociopolitical separation. Even the “Modern Black Convention Movement,” which Komozi Woodard discussed in his book, *A Nation within a Nation*, was the product of a distinctive late 1960s black nationalist mindset. Clearly, the theoretical and ideological lenses through which people viewed their actions matters as much as what they actually did.
Granted, a number of Long Movement historians reject Tyson’s collapsing of Civil Rights and Black Power, and oppose Hall’s subsuming Black Power under Civil Rights. Historians Stephen Ward, Barbara Ransby, Jeffrey O. G. Ogbar, Bettye Collier-Thomas, and V. P. Franklin are among the scholars who argue that Civil Rights and Black Power were interrelated, yet distinct waves of black activism. Peniel Joseph, a major proponent of the emerging subfield of “Black Power Studies,” has gone in the opposite direction from Hall. While Joseph has generally supported the 1954/55–1975 framework for the Civil Rights and Black Power eras, in the article “Black Liberation Without Apology,” he nevertheless locates the “first stage” of Black Power within the 1950s during the Cold War. Here, Black Power, rather than Civil Rights, is expanded to challenge the standard periodization.

Among others, Countryman, Yohuru Williams, and Winston A. Grady-Willis have portrayed Black Power as a “creative outgrowth” of earlier civil rights efforts. Indeed, the social and political terrain encountered by Black Power activists was very different from that confronted by civil rights workers, in large part due to that movement’s qualified success. The U.S. Supreme Court’s 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision, the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the 1965 Voting Rights Act, the 1968 Fair Housing Act, and the Johnson Administration’s War on Poverty programs significantly altered the legal, social, and political landscapes for African Americans. As a result of the CRM, African Americans’ quality of life dramatically improved between 1960 and 1970. For example, the unemployment rate for African American men decreased from 9.6 percent in 1960 to 5.6 percent in 1970. In 1959 the African American median family income was 52 percent that of white families; by 1969, it had risen to 61 percent. These advances cleared the ground for Black Power projects to focus on building alternative institutions, rather than gaining access to existing institutions, and electing African American officials, rather than merely acquiring the vote. A host of new organizations emerged, and existing civil rights organizations such as the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and SNCC, reflecting the changing landscape, underwent substantive transformation, lost members to younger formations, became stagnant, or in too many cases, dissolved. With local grassroots organizations, such transmutations may have been even more dramatic. While “freedom” may have been the consistent goal in each case, the meanings of “freedom” and its articulations reflected the specificities of particular historical moments. Indeed, just as “Negro” gave way to “black,” “freedom” gave way to “liberation” in the era’s lexicon.

As the change in nomenclature suggests, collapsing the Civil Rights and Black Power movements does not account for the transformations in African Americans’ consciousness and identity. During the late 1960s, what African Americans thought about themselves, white people, the United States, Africa,
and the world changed dramatically. According to Cleveland Sellers, a former SNCC leader:

Black Consciousness signaled the end of the use of the word *Negro* by SNCC's members. Black Consciousness permitted us to relate our struggle to the one being waged by Third World revolutionaries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. It helped us understand the imperialistic aspects of domestic racism. It helped us understand that the problems of this nation's oppressed minorities will not be solved without revolution.32

These transformations produced immediate changes in ideology, practices, strategies, leadership, membership, discourses, and symbols. Indeed, they produced a new people—"black" people. This newfound black identity was embodied in groups such as the US Organization and the Black Panther Party, and was reflected at a mass level in African Americans' embrace of new cultural forms and symbols—the Afro and other natural hairstyles, as well as African-derived clothing, names, social values, and holidays. It affected styles of walking, handshakes, tastes in music and art, and language. The personal transformations recorded in the poetry of Don L. Lee/Haki Madhubuti, Sonia Sanchez, and Mari Evans underscore this point. Periodization schemas for the "black freedom movement" must account for changes in identity and mentalities.33

In the process, as historians Jeffrey Ogbar and others have pointed out, Black Power also inspired a new "radical ethnic nationalism" among Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, Asian Americans, Native Americans, and even white working-class migrants from Appalachia. The emergence of radical ethnic nationalism and the different "rainbow" alliances formed by the Panthers and the US Organization clearly distinguishes the late 1960s and Black Power from previous historical periods and social movements.34

At root, the transition from Civil Rights to Black Power reflected the declining predominance of liberal-integrationist thought and strategies, including discourses on "citizenship," "fair employment," bi-racial, Democratic-led liberal coalitions, and the resurgence of black nationalist and radical ideologies with concepts such as "It's Nation Time," "community control," and an independent black political agenda. We fully acknowledge that black nationalism and revolutionary internationalism were present among a cohort of activists during the period 1955–1965, as historians Peniel Joseph, Robin D. G. Kelley, and others have documented. An African American radical contingent cohered around the Bandung Conference, the Cuban Revolution, the African independence movements, and internationally-focused periodicals. However, unlike in the 1920s with the mass support for Marcus Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association, black nationalism was a submerged tendency in the 1950s and early 1960s with few proponents and institutional bases outside Elijah Muhammad's Nation of Islam. As Fischer has argued, *the thing becoming* should not be confused with *the thing itself*. Black nationalist, internationalist, and
radical trends did not shape movement agendas or mobilize large numbers of people between 1954 and 1965. It was the consolidation of these tendencies into a broad strategy based on experiences derived in part from southern and northern civil rights campaigns that constituted Black Power.\(^\text{35}\)

From this perspective, “Civil Rights” and “Black Power” remain relevant as conceptual and period markers for the BLM. Thus, in the 1955–1965 period when de jure segregation existed, its elimination was central to achieving political, social, and economic parity. The predominant movement strategy was nonviolent direct action, aimed at the structures of U.S. apartheid. This strategy took the form of demands for desegregation of public accommodations, with liberal integrationism as the predominant ideological discourse. Strategically, in response to the Cold War, the civil rights mainstream crafted a counterhegemonic patriotism, celebrating putative American values, while simultaneously struggling to transform them.\(^\text{36}\) Internationally speaking, Jim Crow’s persistence threatened the United States’ credibility in its competition with the Soviet Union, and potentially jeopardized its overtures to emergent nation-states in Africa and Asia. Dr. Martin Luther King and other mainstream civil rights leaders were aware of “Third World” independence movements, and frequently expressed solidarity with them. However, unlike black activists in the 1930s and early 1940s and in the late 1960s and early 1970s, civil rights leaders did not actively contest the prerogatives of American empire for fear of attacks from anticommunist crusaders.\(^\text{37}\)

In the period 1966 to 1975, it was not so much that the locus of movement activity shifted from South to North (inclusive of the West), or that the nature of the activities changed, but that the goals, strategy, ideology, and especially the discourse and symbols changed dramatically. Moreover, by this phase, profound economic restructuring had begun to have an impact, spawning both federal antipoverty programs and recurring urban rebellions. Activists confronted a situation in which previous efforts had outlawed legal segregation, yet de facto forms of racial oppression persisted. Activists confronted an environment in which public support for the movement had not only declined, but a vitriolic white backlash surged across the nation. Activists adopted strategies that were self-consciously black nationalist or radical in ideology, discourse, and symbolism; and previously “subterranean” forces and trends burst to the surface. At the same time, the United States was deeply mired in the war in Southeast Asia, and U.S. foreign policy had become more nakedly coercive in its dealings with revolutionary and nationalist movements abroad. Not only did many Black Power advocates view themselves as engaged in revolutionary struggle in the United States, but they also viewed their activism as part of a worldwide anti-imperialist movement.
The Undead: Rootless and Wandering

A final characteristic of Long Movement theorists is their challenge to the boundaries separating the North and the South. For some scholars defying the uniqueness of the South serves the sole purpose of emphasizing northern black activism as something other than an appendage or the antithesis of the southern struggles. Some such as Levy want to deconstruct the categories “North” and “South” to make visible the distinct conditions in the border states. On the other hand, Hall, Payne, Theoharis, and others are interested in undermining the trope of southern particularity. Theoharis contends that centering the historiography of the black freedom movement on the South creates the illusion that “southern racism was more malignant than the strains found in the rest of the country.” Segregation in law, she argued, is hardly distinguishable from segregation in fact. Hall is more restrained in her conclusions, yet she similarly maintained that a longer periodization of the movement “undermines the trope of the South as the nation’s ‘opposite other.’” According to Payne, defending North-versus-South distinctions becomes even more frivolous when one considers the role of the South in shaping the United States’s overall political culture historically. By skillfully separating the concept of segregation from structural inequities, power relations, and white privilege, southern ideologues affected national racial discourses: racial oppression became confused with interpersonal “race relations”—the innocuous, individual social preferences and prerogatives. “By mid-century,” wrote Payne, “the southern paradigm had become deeply embedded in national thinking about race.”

Payne’s thesis is compelling, as are Theoharis’s arguments; yet, it is not surprising that many of the scholars seeking to erase the Mason-Dixon Line, a task more easily accomplished in print than in reality, also seek to merge Civil Rights and Black Power. Both revisions are intertwined, and stem from the same totalizing perspective in which continuity is overdetermined. The fallacy of arguing for North-South continuity is that it ignores regional variations in political economy, frequency and modes of racial violence, levels of political incorporation, and the stark differentials in wages and wealth between African Americans in the South and the North. Speaking of the Mississippi and Arkansas Delta, a region she described as the “American Congo,” historian Nan Elizabeth Woodruff observed, “That local law dominated the American Congo and kept federal authority at a distance was no accident.” In the Delta, the convict lease system, though banned in 1913, operated openly until 1939. And when peonage, convict leasing and vagrancy laws failed to prevent African Americans’ efforts to advance, planters resorted to terrorism.

The plantation economy with its sharecropping system and repressive mechanisms of social control prevailed across the South from the 1870s to the early 1960s, leaving terror and poverty in its wake. In 1953, the African
American median family income was $3,353 in the South, compared to an average of $6,454 in the North. In 1964, the figures were $3,364 in the South and $7,047 in the North. By 1974, black southerners had significantly closed the regional gap in median family income, but at $6,730, it was about what African Americans living in the North had made two decades earlier (northern black families were by then making an average of $9,260.) These differentials were mainly a consequence of the different regional political economies. In the South the plantation economy and the brutal technologies of social control which it spawned did not really begin to recede until the 1950s. To ignore or minimize these fundamental differences is to question the wisdom of millions of African Americans who fled or were driven out of areas like the “American Congo” for Chicago’s Bronzeville and other northern black communities.40

From our perspective, the ideological influence which southern segregationists wielded nationally, or the strength that southern politicians exercised in the U.S. Congress, speaks not to the generality of racism across the North-South continuum, but rather to Dixie’s distinctiveness. That is to say, “Dixie democracy” and its impact nationally were achieved under very specific sociohistorical circumstances not replicated in the North. Indeed, racism was never just a southern problem, and black freedom activists were never simply concerned with racial oppression in the South. Yet, as Countryman stated, and as Theoharis’s work on pre-Watts activism in Los Angeles implied, the strategies and goals of the southern wing of the movement provided potent models for mass protest and movement building in northern urban centers such as Philadelphia and Newark. While black freedom struggles in the South may not have been exceptional, Countryman does suggest that southern struggles were central to the overall movement.41

Theoharis presumes that distinctions between southern and northern racial oppression represents a preoccupation with norms and attitudes, and whereas southern segregation was clear and intentional, northern segregation was unsystematic and stemmed from individual prejudice. We believe this is a false distinction. While historians of the South have delineated aspects of Dixie’s uniqueness, studies in African American urban history have documented the institutional character of racial inequalities in the North in forms as diverse as zoning laws, housing markets, employment, education, and policing. We agree with historian Kevin Gaines, who observed, “[W]hile blacks in the North were plagued by racial and economic discrimination, prohibitions on rights were not as comprehensive, nor as deadly, as in the South.” As Jack M. Bloom made clear, Jim Crow constituted a system of laws, policies, and practices that maintained African American subordination within a southern mode of production led foremost, though not exclusively, by a white agrarian elite. Within this southern class structure, apartheid’s components were economic—the preservation of exploitative systems of black sharecropping, tenant farming, and casual and
coerced labor; political—prohibitions against African Americans registering and/or exercising the vote; and social—the strict regulation of African American interactions with whites, in terms of rituals of deference, restrictions on access to public accommodations, and maintained through a combination of brute force and paternalistic "civility." Although sanctioned by the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the federal government, these characteristics of U.S. racism were unique to and fully operational in the South.  

How else does one make sense of the South's conflicted place in the popular memory of generations of African Americans? How does one interpret the circumstances surrounding the murder of Emmett Till, without accounting for his unfamiliarity with southern racial etiquette? One may also consider the enactment of local fair employment practice laws in the 1940s and 1950s. Although they were limited and easily subverted, they nonetheless represented reforms achieved largely in the North. Expunging the differences between North and South not only disfigures the past, but also does a disservice to the activists who clearly recognized those differences. The fact that Mississippi was widely considered "the belly of the beast" of southern white racism was no figment of northern journalists' imagination.

Delineating the history of the South reveals that its forms of racial oppression and the frequency with which vigilante justice manifested itself made it a distinct region. Our argument is not that the North was more racially enlightened, but that the structural and ideological elements in the South necessitated a more violent, virulent, and impoverishing form of racial oppression. The regional differences at issue are not normative and attitudinal, but rather historical, structural, and ideological. As such, they involve matters of political economy, dominant relations of production, demographics, systems of law, cultural patterns, and other characteristics that either enabled or constrained African American agency. The point is that the Mason-Dixon Line, and the differences it personifies, were not illusory, no more than the contrast between "Civil Rights" and "Black Power."

**CONCLUSION: WHAT IS AT STAKE?**

We argue that the historical fallacies characteristic of the Long Movement thesis are symptomatic of the need for greater theorization of African American history. We need an historical-theoretical framework of the BLM, one that is mindful of political, economic, spatial, ideological, discursive, and cultural factors, as well as subjective activity, in shaping paradigms of African American resistance in consistent, though contextually specific, ways across time and space. In our critique of the Long Movement thesis, we are not suggesting that it is totally lacking in insight, or that its tendency toward ahistoricism reflects bad faith. To the contrary, the overemphasis on temporal, conceptual, and spatial
continuity in Long Movement narratives reflects a social-democratic, antiracist desire to protect the legacies of the Black Liberation Movement.

Nevertheless, like the vampire’s promises of eternal life, the Long Movement’s tendency toward expanding periodization schemas, erasing conceptual differences, and eliminating regional distinctions can be seductive. But the vampire is ultimately the agent of a stagnant, enduring “undead.” Tendencies in the Long Movement scholarship threaten a similarly static, inert outcome. Its totalizing perspective on the BLM renders the African American experience effectively ahistorical. From the standpoint of imagining a transformative politics at the current moment, this tendency has great significance. From an ahistorical perspective, if African America is in dire straits today, and no effective popular movement currently exists to make demands for change, then one can at least take comfort in the knowledge that the contemporary challenges are not qualitatively different from those previously encountered. One might, then, mistakenly presume that since African Americans have always resisted, the prospects are not different in the present.

Yet if “everything is everything,” and the social landscape of oppression and resistance is undifferentiated, historians oriented toward movement politics inadvertently absolve themselves of the necessity of critically assessing the unique political, social, and ideological climate of their own time, and the limits and possibilities it poses. We avoid examining, for instance, why African American radicals today struggle for legitimacy, unlike in the 1930s or late 1960s, or why African American grassroots demands for charter schools, though consistent with previous black nationalist projects, also uphold a neoliberal agenda. For scholar-activists, an undifferentiated view of African American history avoids the hard work of crafting and implementing political agendas relevant to mobilizing concrete constituencies at specific moments. We lose sight of the fact that we must assess and respond to the historical problems of the present on their own terms.

We must move beyond asserting the obvious: that African Americans have acted in their own interests. We should instead consider how they have understood and defined their interests, as well as the historical particularities of their actions. A totalizing approach that assumes an unchanging essence to African American struggle places the struggle outside the realm of time. African Americans have not only thought different things, but they have also thought differently about the same things. Even when actions have assumed similar forms during different periods, the ways in which African Americans have regarded their activity in each period have not necessarily been identical. We should transcend easy axioms and confront the possibilities of how the current moment may, or may not, lend itself to certain types of resistance. Oppression has bred many forms of African American agency; resistance has been only one. As
historian Richard B. Pierce illustrates in his book *Polite Protest*, accommodation has been another.43

The stakes in refining a historical theory of the BLM lie in the ways in which it can help ground transformative political projects. Ideas about social structure, change and directionality are embedded in all social movement politics, no less today than in the past. However, the question is: Are we conscious of their existence? To the extent that we are, we may more effectively shape the outcomes of programs for social change. Historicizing the study of the BLM gives us no ready-made template for our own problem solving. But in fostering historical consciousness at the level of praxis, its contribution is invaluable to a unity of theory and action that represents the African American activist-intellectual tradition at its best.

NOTES

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3 Yohuru Williams, Matthew Countryman and Robert O. Self are three historians who take place and urban processes seriously; see Yohuru Williams, *Black Politics/White Power: Civil Rights, Black Power, and the Black Panthers in New Haven* (St. James, NY, 2000); Countryman, *Up South*; and Self, *American Babylon*.4


6 Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Political Insurgency, 1930–1970 (Chicago, IL, 1982); Manning Marable, Race, Reform and Rebellion: The Second Reconstruction in Black America, 1945–1990 (Jackson, MS, 1991); and Jack M. Bloom, Race, Class, and the Civil Rights Movement (Bloomington, IN, 1987).


8 Peter B. Levy, Civil War on Race Street: The Civil Rights Movement in Cambridge, Maryland (Gainesville, FL, 2003), 184; Theoharis and Woodard, Freedom North; Theoharis and Woodard, Groundwork; Countryman, Up South; Nikhil Pal Singh, Black Is a Country: Race and the Unfinished Struggle for Democracy (Cambridge, MA, 2004); and Hall, “The Long Civil Rights Movement,” 1245; and Self, American Babylon, 17, 18 and 28.

9 Clayborne Carson, “Civil Rights Reform and the Black Freedom Struggle,” 21, 23; Theoharis and Woodard, Groundwork; 3; Timothy B. Tyson, Radio Free Dixie: Robert F. Williams & the Roots of Black Power (Chapel Hill, NC, 1999); 3; and Theoharis, Black Freedom Struggles,” 352.


13 Despite his arguments for specificity, Eagles himself was an early proponent of the “long movement.” As partisans, we find his notion of “detachment” highly problematic, but in the tradition of C. L. R. James we accept the idea of a “rounded analysis,” that is an analysis that engages all sides in a dispute; see, Charles Eagles, “Toward New Histories of the Civil Rights Era.”


Temporal and Spatial Fallacies in Recent Black Freedom Studies


19 Williams, The Politics of Public Housing, 91.


21 Fallacies of semantic distortion occur when terms are ill-defined. See David Hackett Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought (New York, 1970), 265, 276.


29 Komoloz Woodard, A Nation within a Nation: Amiri Baraka (LeRoi Jones) and Black Power Politics (Chapel Hill, NC, 1999).


31 This does not even address how the resistance to the Black Liberation movement also changed. Countryman, Up South; Williams, Black Politics/White Power; Grady-Willis, Challenging Apartheid, and Victor Perlo, Deterioration of Black Economic Conditions in the 1980s,” Review of Radical Political Economics 20 (No. 2 1985): 57.


33 Ogbar, Black Power, 94–95, 143–45; Martin, No Coward Soldiers, 30; Scot Brown, Fighting for US: Maulana Karenga, the US Organization, and Black Cultural Nationalism (New York, 2005), 11; and Keith Mayes, “A


Fisher, Historians' Fallacies, 21; Joseph, "Waiting Till the Midnight Hour," 6--17; and Kelley, "Stormy Weather."


Countryman, Up South, 94--98; and Theoharis, "Alabama on Avalon," 40.

